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72nd MORS Symposium 
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2 September 2004 
To gain maritime dominance in the littorals in the 2020 timeframe, the US Navy must have 
capabilities to assure access to the littorals and to enable Sea Basing and Sea Strike. These 
capabilities necessitate innovative and radical concepts for systems, tactics, support, and force 
structures. Focusing on only system-of systems (SoS) concepts, we consider a system of only 
manned platforms, a system of primarily unmanned platforms, and a balanced hybrid system of 
manned and unmanned platforms. Based on a cost, risk-to-personnel, performance, and 
sensitivity analysis, using a Shallow Water Acoustics Toolset (Excel/SWAT), the Autonomous 
Littoral Warfare Systems Evaluator Discrete Event Simulation (ALWSE), and a Force/Theater 
Extend™ Model, we select a balanced hybrid system of manned and unmanned platforms that 
uses distributed communications network architecture and a decentralized command and control 
structure. Our work demonstrates that unmanned platforms, while cost effective and capable of 
reducing risk to personnel, complement but cannot replace manned platforms. Manned 
platforms will still be required for command and control, crucial operational decision making, 
and logistics support to unmanned vehicles. Finally, we suggest further research to provide 
additional insight into the solution to the problem of maritime dominance in the littorals. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the Soviet decline as a combat competitor to the United States, combat has shifted 
from blue water to littoral regions. Unlike in blue-water combat operations, the responsive 
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reaction time of the warfighter in littoral combat operations is reduced, because he is now closer 
to the threat, and sensor response and performance are degraded by the rapidly changing littoral 
environment. The shift towards littoral combat operations thus requires that a system of 
systems (SoS) be capable of overcoming the challenges of short reaction times and littoral 
environments. By a system of systems it is meant an aggregation of independent systems 
interlinked to execute a military mission. 
In 2001 and 2002 the Naval Warfare Development Command investigated and 
demonstrated the utility of flotillas of small, fast craft in littoral waters in facilitating forcible 
entry to an adversary's territory. The Total Ship Systems Engineering SEA LANCE project at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) produced a concept of such a small craft, SEA LANCE 
(SEA LANCE 2002). Such small vessels operating in an adversary's littoral waters would 
presumably be very vulnerable. Resolution of this issue precipitated the first Systems 
Engineering & Analysis (SEA) interdisciplinary project, dubbed "CROSSBOW". In this 
CROSSBOW study the SEA2 students (SEA cohort 2) developed a concept of operations at the 
total force level for a system of systems which would permit the deployment of weapon and 
sensor grids in an adversary's littorals, using the small, fast SEA LANCE ships, but with a 
degree of air support that enhanced the likelihood of success. The CROSSBOW study indicated 
a need for unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) operating from a small, fast ship platform, 
augmented by unmanned air vehicles (UAV) for surveillance and similar missions. The 
CROSSBOW force consisted of SEA ARCHER, small, fast ships (13,000 LT, 60 kts) with a 
UCAV/UAV "air wing'', the SEA ARROW UCAV, the SEA QUIVER logistic support ships and 
other elements (SEA 2001). The CROSSBOW effort was widely recognized as a useful 
educational tool as well as a vehicle for fostering innovative thinking beyond the NPS campus . 
As a result, SEA cohort 3, in response to a tasking from the Chief of Naval Operations staff 
undertook an examination of Expeditionary Warfare in the 2015 timeframe. It investigated the 
placement of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade as far as 200 nautical miles (nm) inland, to be 
inserted in accordance with Ship To Objective Maneuver doctrine and to be supported from a 
Sea Base located as far as 200 nm offshore, by conducing a detailed comparative analysis of the 
current, planned (current and programs of record) and conceptual expeditionary warfare systems 
of systems. The conceptual architecture was defined by adding the systems designed by the 
supporting teams to the planned Navy/Marines Corps expeditionary warfare capabilities SEA 
2002). The task of the next interdisciplinary study addressed the area of force protection, 
focusing on Force Protection of the Sea Base and a design of the "mission modular" Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) optimized for the force protection role. It examined the relative 
effectiveness of distributed weapons and sensors in a networked environment in protecting a 
specific Sea Base. The SEA4 work concluded that the force protection mission would benefit 
greatly from an increased use of unmanned vehicles of all kinds. 
The results of the preceding studies motivated an exploration of the role of unmanned 
vehicles -- Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV), Surface Vehicles (USV) and Underwater Vehicles 
(USV) -- in enabling key SEA POWER 21 concepts of SEA BASING and SEA STRIKE (Clark 
2002) for maritime dominance in the littorals in the 2020 timeframe. SEA BASING is defined as 
the massing of supplies and equipment on a seaborne platform hosting a family of systems that 
maximize projection of Naval Power and SEA STRIKE as the projection of power from sea-
based assets to all littoral targets. Tasked to undertake such exploration (Calvano 2003), we 




Define and select a cost-effective system of systems (SoS) 
architecture and its concept of operations that would enable SEA 
BASING and SEA STRIKE for maritime dominance in the 
littorals in the 2020 timeframe. The SoS would consist of sea-
based, land-based, an airborne sensor and weapon systems that are 
(i) both manned and unmanned, (ii) in existence, in development, 
and future concepts, and (iii) networked via communications links 
and space systems to achieve success of the following littoral 
missions in a littoral area of 200 nautical miles inland by 200 
nautical miles offshore, with the minimum risk to personnel: (1) 
Establishment of the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP); (2) 
Identification and, if necessary, reduction of hostile threats to 
within capability of the sea base; and (3) enabling projection of 
offensive capabilities from the sea. 
Subscribing to the usual systems engineering process and starting with the problem 
immediately defined above, we generate SoS alternatives, model, analyze and score the SoS 
alternatives, and select and implement the most cost effective and best performing SoS. This 
'soup to nuts' comprehensiveness distinguishes this effort from the previous studies. Like the 
previous studies, this is a coordinated effort from multiple disciplines from the NPS Integrated 
Project, incorporating both individual and team research efforts in areas of physics, information 
technology, and operational analysis with support from industry and agencies in the Departmen 
of Defense. Teams from the TEMASEK Defense Systems Institute (TDSI), Fleet Numerical 
Meteorology Operation Center, NPS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Working Group, Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Naval Surface Warfare Center contribute to the areas of 
unmanned vehicle reliability and conceptual operations in a littoral operating environment for 
joint operations. Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin also provide 
relevant information. 
We consider three SoS alternative categories: a system of only manned platforms, a system 
of primarily unmanned platforms, and a balanced hybrid system of manned and unmanned 
platforms. As key integral parts of the systems engineering process, a cost analysis and a 
simulative analysis, supported by EXTEND™ (Imagine That 2002), ALWSE-MC (NAVSEA 
2003), SWAT, and Excel, lead to the following primary conclusions of the study: 
Unmanned vehicles complement but cannot replace manned platforms. The 
recommended system of systems enabling SEA BASING and SEA STRIKE 
in 200 nm by 200 nm littoral operation area in 2020 timeframe consists of 
unmanned/manned vehicle ratio of approximately 1.5 to 1; utilizes distributed 
communications with 1 OOnm physical platform distribution; employs 
decentralized command & control structure; and is cost effective relative to 
other alternatives; and minimizes risk to personnel. 
A system of only unmanned platforms thus does not provide a silver-bullet solution to the 
problem of maritime dominance in the littorals; unmanned platforms thus complement but 
cannot replace manned systems. Manned platforms are still required to implement command and 




themselves will not have the ability to adapt to dynamic threat environments. Manned platforms 
will therefore continue to provide essential command and control element in military force 
structures. Furthermore, limited in endurance and thereby requiring manned system support, 
unmanned vehicles cannot completely keep personnel out of harm's way, yet they can greatly 
reduce the level of risk to which personnel are exposed. 
In the remainder of this paper we first describe the different UV types and, in particular, the 
unmanned systems delivery vehicle (USDV) developed by the TDSI team during this work. We 
next define three SoS force compositions, describe the SoS architecture attributes, and define 
SoS architectures. We then postulate the events that lead to the 2020 South China Sea scenario 
and define three associated tactical scenarios and related threats. We next describe the simulative 
study along with the simulation tools and algorithms used; this simulative effort provides 
quantitative measures employed in ranking the different SoS architectures and selecting the cost 
effective SoS architecture. We continue with a sensitive analysis used to validate the ranking 
and selection results. Finally, we summarize the findings of this work and conclude with 
recommendations for further research. 
Sos PLATFORM CATEGORIES 
Functional analysis leads to a functional architecture, which, embedded in platforms, leads 
to SoS force compositions. Since the scope of this paper is to present the analysis and simulation 
that enable selection of an SoS, we only briefly enumerate the SoS top-level functions here. A 
detailed description of the SoS functions can be found in (SEAS 2004). The functional analysis 
involves identification and decomposition of the functions to be performed in support of the 
missions identified in the problem statement above, using Boyd's OODA loop (Observe, Orient, 
Decide, Act) as a framework (Boyd 1987). The resulting top-level functions are: Surveillance, 
Threat Analysis and Evaluation, Battle Management, and Engagement. 
Unmanned Vehicle (UV) Types 
The UV considered in this work are classified according to size - small, medium, and large 
and to the functions of surveillance, strike, and multi-mission. Figure 1 displays some 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) categorized by size (small, medium, and large). Unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUV) and unmanned surface vehicles (USV) are classified solely by the 
function they perform. With these classifications, the SoS force decompositions will contain 
five UA V types two USV, and three UUV. Table 1 shows the different UA V types with their 
respective parameters. 




Table 1. Unmanned Vehicle Parameters 
CLASS PAYLOAD (lb) ENDURANCE(hr) ALT (ft) EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE 
1 - Small <75 ::::: 2.5 > 500 Pneumatic Silver Fox 
2-Medium :'.S75<1000 ::::: 10 > 5000 Pneumatic, Short Predator B 
3 - Large ::::: 1000 >30 > 10000 Catapult or runway Global Hawk 
The surveillance UA V perform only surveillance and provide information for the 
development of the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP). The strike UA V perform only air-to-
surface roles, with limited surveillance to allow for weapon targeting. As air-to-air engagement 
is too complicated, a UA V capable of intercepting and destroying air platforms would not be 
available by 2020. The multi-mission UAV can also perform surveillance, but not as well as if 
they are to perform only single missions. 
Furthermore, the medium UAV are assumed to be carrier capable. Using the area of the 
wingspan, the length of the UA V and current manned aircraft, and the dimensions of folded 
wingspans and fuselages, a simple calculation shows that the deck space of a current carrier can 
accommodate seventy medium surveillance UAV. 
Unmanned Systems Delivery Vehicle (USDV) 
We also consider an unmanned vehicle future concept, the unmanned systems delivery 
vehicle (USDV) developed by the TDSI team during this work, to be included in an SoS force 
composition. Figure 2 shows the overall configuration of the USDV with its payload packages . 
The right picture illustrates the deployment of upper deck hatch and the lowering of the lower 
deck ramp. The USDV would benefit US Navy in many ways (Neo 2004), but in this paper we 
discuss its role in the littoral warfare. With its already-developed unmanned systems package 
inserted into the potential battle space, the USDV would take on the initial threat to surface 
combatants and crews, and thereby, extend the stand-off distance for the host platform and 
provide an early picture of the littoral battlespace well in advance of the battle group arrival into 
the area of operation. 
Figure 2. Overall Configuration of the USDV with its Payload Packages (Neo 2004) 
Sos ARCHITECTURES 
In this work an SoS architecture consists of four variables: Force composition (FC) (or 
physical platforms), communications network architecture (CNA), and command and control 
(C2) structure, and platform physical distribution (PPD). Though these variables can form a 
• 
large set of values, for computational efficiency, only three values of FC, CAN, and PPD and 
two values of C2 are chosen. The three values of the communications network architectures 
(CNA) correspond to enclave, hybrid, and distributed. (Figure 3). The two values of C2 
structures correspond to centralized and decentralized structure (Figure 4). These discrete values 
are chosen to reflect practical SoS employment within the established operating environment. 
The variables will be discussed in detail later. 
Force Compositions 
Three force compositions are developed through an iterative process. The first force 
composition consists of only manned systems. The second is a balanced mix of manned and 
unmanned systems. The third consists of primarily unmanned systems. The first force 
composition contains 2003-timeframe systems, manned military platforms used today, while the 
second includes both current systems and some programs of record (POR). The third force 
composition contains manned systems, POR, and future systems. 
The systems to be included in an SoS architecture are assumed to be available and reliable 
for operation in the 2020 timeframe, such as carrier capable unmanned aerial vehicles and 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capable unmanned underwater vehicles. The multi-mission UUV 
would presumably take over the ASW role of manned submarines. The carrier capable UA V 
would replace the manned vehicles scheduled to be decommissioned prior to 2020. Being 
smaller than their manned counterparts, more unmanned vehicles would be carried on the carrier. 
Table 2 shows the various elements in three force compositions. 
• Force Composition One - Manned Only 
• 
Force Composition One contains only manned systems, reflecting those in the current 
carrier battle group (CVBG) and mine warfare assets and Air Force units for operations support. 
A balanced hybrid of manned and unmanned systems, Force Composition Two includes 
surveillance unmanned vehicles and programs of record such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 
Primarily unmanned, Force Composition Three includes multiple unmanned systems in 
surveillance, strike, and multi-mission roles as well as future concepts not yet in development. 
The aircraft carrier (CVN), E-3 AW ACS, and SH-60 are common to all three force 
compositions. The E-3 AW ACS provides air control to manned and unmanned vehicles. The 
SH-60 undertakes anti-submarine warfare and search and rescue (SAR) during carrier flight 
operations involving manned aircraft. Force Composition One has ten SH-60Bs, while the other 
force compositions have only six, due to the eventual phase-out of two frigates (FFG) by 2020. 
The Cruiser (CG), Destroyer (DDG), E2-C Hawkeye, E-8 JSTARS, attack submarines (SSN), 
and F/A-18 Hornets are common to both Force Compositions One and Two. The Cruiser (CG) 
and Destroyer (DDG) perform surface and air surveillance, and threat analysis and evaluation. 
The E2-C Hawkeye performs air and surface surveillance as well as battle management. The 
Air-Force E-8 JSTARS provides ground surveillance and battle management. The attack 
submarines establish undersea pictures and engage enemy undersea assets. Finally, the F/A-18 
Hornets are used for air-to-air and air-to-ground engagements. 
Finally, the Land Helicopter Assault ship (LHA), mine warfare ships (MCM and MHC), 
E/A-6B Prowlers, S-3 Vikings, and F-14 Tomcats complete Force Composition One. The Land 




mine countermeasures, while the E/A-6B Prowlers, S-3 Vikings and F-14 Tomcats some 
surveillance and engagement functions. These platforms will be replaced by other aircraft and 
unmanned vehicles employed in Force Compositions Two and Three. 
Force Composition Two - Balanced Hybrid 
A replacement of some elements in Force Composition One with manned and unmanned 
systems creates Force Composition Two. In this hybrid composition of manned and unmanned 
vehicles, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), fitted anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, 
and mine warfare modules, replaces the LHA's MH-53 and the Frigates and Mine Hunter/Mine 
Countermeasure ships. Each anti-submarine warfare LCS has two ASW UUV; each anti-surface 
warfare LCS two surveillance USV; and each Mine warfare LCS two mine UUV. Force 
Composition Two also incorporates the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Multi-Mission Aircraft 
(MMA), which replaces the P-3. The air wing on the carrier consists of SH-60Bs, E2-Cs, F/A-
18s, JSF and medium surveillance UAV. The F/A-18 Super Hornet takes on the S-3 tanker role 
and the EA-6B electronic warfare role. The F/A-18 Super Hornet and the surveillance UAV 
assist with RMP development, and the F-22 and FIA- 16 contribute to the joint engagement 
mission. 
Force Composition Three - Primarily Unmanned 
Force Composition Three, the primarily unmanned composition, incorporates a large 
number of unmanned vehicles and future systems such as DDX, CGX and LCS. Except for the 
JSF, SH-60B and the E-3 AWACS, which are needed for air-to-air combat and battle 
management, the manned aircraft in the other force compositions are replaced by the multi-
mission and strike unmanned vehicles. The multi-mission USV would perform surface 
surveillance and interdict small patrol boats. Also, the USDV is used to carry short-range UV 
from blue (deep) water into the littoral region. Eight large surveillance UAV replace the E-2C 
Hawkeye. The large surveillance UA V perform air and surface surveillance. 
Table 3 lists only the SoS platforms that have sensors; Table 4 the type and number of 
weapons onboard each weapon-carrying SoS platform; and Table 6 the maximum number of 
personnel manning a SoS platform. 
Communications Network Architectures 
Figure 3 shows the three different CNA considered in this work - enclave, hybrid, and 
distributed. The enclave architecture provides the lowest level of communication connectivity 
(represented by dashed lines) among platforms. Platforms at lower levels must thus utilize 
platforms at higher levels to carry out communications. Consequently, a large number of 
communications nodes (hops) is required to connect any two platforms. The hybrid CNA 
configuration expands connectivity among platforms by adding to the enclave connectivity new 
lines of communication between many platforms at peer levels. This additional connectivity 
thus, on average, reduces the number of hops required to connect platforms. The hybrid 
architecture most closely resembles the current Navy/Joint communications architecture 
employed in the tactical environment. Finally, in the distributed CNA nearly all platforms are 




is significantly reduced. The distributed CNA thus provides the highest level of connectivity 
among platforms. 
Command and Control Structures (C2) 
A C2 structure determines the level of command, establishing which platforms perform C2 
functions (represented as C2 nodes). Orders initiate and reports terminate at these C2 nodes; 
hence, the C2 nodes determine the flow of communications throughout an SoS architecture. In 
this work, we consider two C2 structures - centralized and decentralized. The centralized 
structure places the C2 node(s) at the highest level; it thus increases the effective 
communications path length between reporting, C2, and ordinate platforms. The decentralized 
structure places the C2 nodes at the mid level of the architecture, thus reducing the effective 
communications path length between platforms. Figure 4 depicts the two C2 structures. 
Table 2. SoS Force Compositions 
Platform Sos 1 (Manned) SoS 2 (Balanced Manned/UVHybrid) Sos 3 (Primarily Unmaned) 
CVN 1 1 1 
CG 2 2 0 
CGX 0 0 2 
DOG 4 2 0 
DDX 0 0 2 
LCS 0 6 6 
FFG 2 0 0 
MHC 1 0 0 
MCM 1 0 0 
LHA 1 0 0 
SSN 2 2 0 
E-2C 4 4 0 
E-8 1 1 0 
E-3 1 1 1 
P-3 2 0 0 
MMA 0 2 0 
SH-60 10 7 6 
MH-53 6 0 0 
F/A-18 36 24 0 
F-14 14 0 0 
E/A-68 5 0 0 
B-2 1 0 0 
B-52 2 0 0 
F-117 2 0 0 
JSF 0 18 14 
F-16 0 6 0 
F-22 0 6 0 
S-3 8 0 0 
SSGN 0 2 0 
USV-1 0 4 0 
USV-2 0 0 4 
UAV-1 0 2 8 
UAV-2 0 70 30 
UAV-3 0 20 20 
UAV-4 0 0 30 
UAV-5 0 0 50 
MIW UUV 0 4 4 
ASW UU\I 0 4 10 
• 
Table 3. SoS Architecture Sensors 
SoS Sensor Types 
SoSPlatformType Surface Sensor Air Sensor Subsurf Sensor Mine Sensor Land Sensor 
CG EF-Band EF-Band Surf Sonar 
CGX K-Band K-Band Surf Sonar 
DOG EF-Band EF-Band Surf Sonar 
DDX X-Band X-Band Surf Sonar 
LCS AN/SPS 67 Surf Sonar Surf 
FFG AN/SPS 55 AN/SPS 49 Surf Sonar 
MHC Surf 
MCM Surf 
SSN Sub Sonar 
E-2C Air Borne B-Band B-Band 
E-3 Air Borne B-Band 
P-3 Air SonarJP3) Fol Pen 
MMA Air Sonar]P:ll Fol Pen 
SH-60 EF+ IR 
MH-53 Helo 
S-3 IR Air Sonar JP~ Fol Pen 
SSGN Sub Sonar 
USV-1 AN/SPS 550 + 67 B-BandJD~gradeq}_ 
USV-2 AN/SPS 550 + 67 +IR 
UAV-1 B-BandJ_DElgl"adedl B-BandJ_DElgradedl 
UAV-2 Fol Pen 
UAV-3 IR 
UAV-5 Fol Pen 
MIWUUV uuv 
ASW UUV UUV Sonar 
• Platform Physical Distributions (PPD) 
• 
The spatial distribution of the platforms in the littoral area is called the physical platform 
distribution. The PPD diameter is the distance between the two farthest platforms in the 
distribution or network. It is a measure of the spatial extent of the distribution of sensor and 
weapon platforms as well as ranges between communications nodes. In this work we consider 
three PPDs - small, medium, and wide. The distribution diameters of the small, medium, and 
wide PPDs are, respectively, 50 nm, 100 nm, and 150 nm. Figure 5 depicts the three PPD 
schematics. 
SoS Architecture Alternatives 
An SoS architecture is thus a quadruplet, A= (FC, CAN, C2, PPD), where FC = 1 for 
Force Composition One, 2 Force Composition Two, and 3 Force Composition Three, CNA = 1 
for enclave, 2 hybrid, and 3 distributed , C2 = 1 for centralized and 2 decentralized, and PPD = 1 
for small, 2 medium, and 3 large. There are thus fifty four distinct SoS architectures. For 
example, (2, 1, 2, 2) means an architecture that uses the hybrid force composition, the enclave 
communication architecture, the distributed C2 structure, and the medium platform physical 
distribution. 
The simulative study evaluates the performance of these fifty-four architectures against the 
different tactical scenarios, which are described next 































ASW UUV Torpedo 
• 
Table 4. SoS Architecture Weapons 
Sos Weapon Types SoSWeapons (#) 
Air Sub Surf Mine Land Surf ace Air Sub Surf 
Sea S_Q_arrow 32 
SM-RAM TolJl_edo Tomahawk 8 63 6 
SM-RAM TorQ_edo Tomahawk 8 63 6 
SM-RAM TolJl_edo Tomahawk 8 45 6 
SM-RAM TolJl_edo Tomahawk 8 45 6 
RAM TolJl_edo MH-63 Sled 8 11 6 




TolJl_edo Tomahawk 1 1 
TolJl_edo 1 4 
TolJl_edo 1 4 
TorQedo 1 2 
MH-53 Sled 
AIM-9X JSOW 2 2 





AIM-9X JSOW 2 2 
AIM-9X JSOW 2 2 
AIM-9X JSOW 2 2 
TolJl_edo 1 2 
To!E_edo Tomahawk 1 1 
USV Sled 2 
JSOW 1 
Hellfire 1 
Torpedo 2 2 
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Command and Control (C2) 
- Centralized 
- Decentralized 
• Manned Platform 
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Figure 4. Command and Control Structure 
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Table 5. SoS Architecture Personnel 
Sos Person.nel 
SoSPlatformType PersonnelJ#l SoSPlatform Type Personnell_#l 
CVN 5680 F-14 2 
CG 364 E/A-68 4 
CGX 120 B-2 2 
DOG 323 B-52 5 
DDX 98 F-117 1 
LCS 50 JSF 1 
FFG 220 F-16 1 
MHC 51 F-22 1 
MCM 84 S-3 2 
LHA 964 SSGN 155 
SSN 129 USV-1 0 
E-2C 5 USV-2 0 
E-8 21 UAV-1 0 
E-3 15 UAV-2 0 
P-3 11 UAV-3 0 
MMA 11 UAV-4 0 
SH-60 3 UAV-5 0 
MH-53 6 MIW UUV 0 
F/A-18 1 ASW UUV 0 
THREATS AND SCENARIOS 
For the purpose of SoS architecture evaluation we assume that the LMD SoS will be 
deployed against the People's Republic of China (PRC), a US near-peer competitor. The 
selection of the PRC as the opposition forces in the South China Sea Region in no way 
represents the view of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Navy, and the United States. 
US force compositions in an SoS architecture are discussed above, which are based on the 
Naval Expeditionary Strike Group (NESG) model. Operating areas are scoped within a bounded 
area of responsibility 200 nautical miles (nm) along the littoral coast, reaching up to 200 nm into 
land and out to sea from the coast. Task Force Commanders are expected to have sufficient 
forces and logistics necessary to initiate mission tasking in a joint military operation. 
Interoperability issues (e.g., intercommunications capability, sensor interface, and logistic lines 
of communication,) will have been resolved prior to SoS deployment 
People's Republic of China (PRC) Forces 
As open source information about PRC capabilities in the 2020 timeframe is extremely 
limited (Annual Report 2003, Stokes 1999, FAS), we assume the future PRC capabilities 
enunciated in the NPS integrated Joint Campaign Analysis (JCA) study of the South China Sea 
Scenario. Table 5 lists the probabilities of kill of the threats against the SoS platforms. These 
values reflect threat weapon capabilities (Globalsecurity.org & Sinodefence.com) and the 




Table 5. PRC Weapons Kill Probability, P(K) 
En em ~ 
SoSPlatform DDG FFG PGM F.!g!:tter Bomber Missile Diesel Sub NucSub Mini Sub Mine Launcher 
CVN 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.75 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 
CG 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 
CGX 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 
DDG 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.75 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 
DDX 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.75 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 
LCS 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
FFG 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
MHC 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
MCM 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
LHA 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 
SSN 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 
E-2C 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
E-8 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
E-3 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
P-3 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
MMA 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
SH-60 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.65 0.65 
MH-53 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.65 0.65 
F/A-18 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 
F-14 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 
E/A-68 0.6 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 
B-2 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
B-52 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
F-117 0.6 0.5 0.75 0.4 0.4 
JSF 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 
F-16 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 
F-22 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 
S-3 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.65 0.65 
SSGN 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 
USV-1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
USV-2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
UAV-1 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
UAV-2 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
UAV-3 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
UAV-4 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
UAV-5 0.7 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.7 
MIWUUV 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 
ASW UUV 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 
We assume also that the PRC lags five to ten years behind the US in technological 
advances. Consequently, an SoS would face mostly asymmetrical and conventional threats 
(SUW, USW, MIW, and AA W). Also, despite the PRC military's current effort to improve in-
flight refueling, to develop advanced stealth technologies, and to build nuclear vessel aircraft 
carriers and submarines, it will not have unmanned vehicles and focused energy weapons in 
2020. Furthermore, presumably obligated by other interests, the PRC Army-Air Force (PLAAF) 
assets will not be available for reinforcement. The PRC assets used in the tactical scenarios thus 
comprise all available assets in theatre. Finally, no other nations in the region provide forces to 
reinforce the PRC units. 
Events Leading to 2020 Scenarios 
In 2010, having been peacefully united with Taiwan, the PRC now focuses it attention to 
the South China Sea region and its western borders. 
In 2015, the PRC Navy reinforces its presence in the Spratly Islands (specially on Mischief 
and Alison Reef) by installing three paved runways, pier and maintenance facilities, Air Defense 
Artillery (ADA) batteries, and ballistic missile sites. The Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, Japan, and the United States individually condemn the PRC's 




and the Philippines, however, form a defense treaty and protest China's aggressive behavior in 
the area. The United States and the Philippines have previously established a similar treaty in 
2010. 
Princess a 
Figure 6. Map of Pala wan Island 
The year is 2020. To affirm rights to the offshore oil reserves in the South China Sea, the 
PRC now increases its naval presence in the South China Seas by deploying ships and aircraft 
from its northern fleets to augment the South China Fleet. Despite repeated protests, PRC naval 
exercises frequently disregard the territorial seas of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Early in the year 2020, a Philippine jet aircraft, having warned a PRC warship to clear the area, 
strafes a PRC destroyer that is firing its gun within two miles of Palawan Island's coast (Figure 
6). Ten PRC sailors are killed and the destroyer returns fire but fails to hit the aircraft. 
International tensions begin to rise in response. 
Two months have passed since the strafing incident and, claming self-defense and the need 
to establish a "safety" perimeter around the South China Sea, the PRC invades Kepulauan 
Natuna (Indonesia) with a division of PRC infantry, supported by air defense regiments, and ten 
shore-based anti-ship missile batteries. The PRC further threatens to invade Palawan Island 
(Philippines) if any of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations reacts. 
PRC forces have not yet begun overtly hostile actions against the Philippines, but several PRC 
surface combatants are steaming easterly from the Spratlys. 
US force dispersion in the region is heavily affected by the change in national policy and 
the evolution of military technology. With KITTY HAWK's decommissioning in 2008, no US 
conventional carrier is available to station in Japan. Instead, a NESG, composed of one LHD 




three DDG (not TBMD capable), remains forward deployed in Japan along with one MEU-sized 
Marine force in Okinawa. The Amphibious ships in Japan provide the amphibious lift for the 
Okinawa Marines. All other U.S. forces, including those in Korea, have been withdrawn to the 
United States and now form Expeditionary Forces. Currently, one carrier battle group and one 
naval expeditionary strike group are both underway east of Leyte Gulf and can be redirected to 
the region. US forces are now also augmented with unmanned vehicles. In response to the 
growing tension in the region, Commander Pacific (COMPAC) has stood up Commander Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) Sea Tiger to monitor the situation and construct plans should occupation of 
Philippine territory become a reality. 
Tactical Scenarios 
The South China Sea scenario spawns three separate scenarios of gradually increasing level 
of difficulty with time for US forces. A level of difficulty is characterized by (a) mission 
tasking, (b) enemy force structure, and (c) level of hostility. Scenario One signifies a benign 
operating environment, Scenario Two a nominal environment, and Scenario Three a stressing 
environment. The increasing intensity of the three factors, hence, an increasing level of 
difficulty, increases linearly from Scenario One to Scenario Three. Figure 7 schematically 
depicts the levels of difficulty of three scenarios - benign, medium, and stressing. 
Scenario One (Benign Scenario) 
The PRC government immediately calls for a treaty with the Philippines and Indonesia to 
establish a New Era of South China Sea Cooperation among perimeter nations and gives them 
one month to respond. Led by the United States, the ASEAN nations condemn the PRC's action 
and submit a joint U.N. resolution to establish sanctions against the PRC. The Security Council 
vetoes the resolution. 
The PRC naval forces (Table 6) -- Two Houjain PGMs and five Houxin PGMs -- have 
begun a thirty-day quarantine of Puerta Princesa port (Palawan) in tandem with the PRC's 
positioning of a maritime division landing force in the Spratly Islands along with several 
airborne divisions in the Guangzhou District preparing for invasion. Reports, on occasion, 
include several sightings of diesel submarines operating along with PRC gunboats, but none as 
yet confirm PRC mining of harbors. No attempt is made to challenge China's blockade of 
Pala wan. 
SoS forces are to locate and identify the PRC forces operating in and around the island of 
Palawan and the PRC vessels engaging in hostile acts while blockading Puerta Princessa; 
establishment of a Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) is a priority for the US forces. The 
known location of suspected diesel sub operating areas will greatly aid in planning for mission 
priority and defining strategies. US forces are expected to encounter a benign operating 
environment. 
Scenario Two (Medium Scenario) 
A PRC maritime division landing force, augmented by two light infantry and one artillery 
division, is invading the island of Palawan. The Phillipines officially objects to the occupation 




aggressor. The ASEAN Alliance denounces PRC's occupation of Palawan and, backed by US 
diplomatic pressure, pushes once more for UN sanctions against the PRC requiring reparations 
on behalf of the Phillipines. The motion fails, vetoed by the Security Council. 
PRC reinforcements are now forward staged in the Spratlys through the Paracel Islands 
(Table 6), which include two infantry, two artillery, and one armored division. The PRC forces 
have begun immediate fortifications of Puerta Princessa Airport as well as heavy defensive 
mining along the southern shores and within the harbor. Fifty DF-21 MRBM are being relocated 
to the Paracel Islands. Twenty TU-16 Badgers (air-to-surface capable) are flying into Puerta 
Princessa Airport to conduct routine coastal patrols. The 48-kiloton Aircraft Carrier (thirty SU-
30 fighters) has taken up routine operations northwest of the Palawan's northern tip while 
submarine sightings in both the Sulu and Philippine Seas are routine. As of the 33rd day of the 
blockade, ten Jiangwei FFG, ten Houjain PGM, twenty Houxin PGM are positioning themselves 
in coves along the Palawan coast while the first of three Sovremny DDG (remaining two vessels 
spotted via satellite steaming southward just east of the Paracels) is making berth in Puerta 
Princessa. 
US RECCE operations are being upgraded to target evaluation. Deployed forces are to 
identify both actual and likely PRC troop defensive positions. SAG commanders should forward 
recommended target selections and alternatives for target matrix development and analysis to 
battle staffs noting key battlespace obstacles, including likely channels of approach, estimated 
enemy troop strengths, and task force hazards. Identification of most likely methods and routes 
for enemy Sea Lanes of Communication is critical; it is believed that, in addition to RORO (roll-
on-roll-off cargo ship) assets, the PRC is employing small fishing vessels from the Spratly 
Islands for ground troop support. It is the goal of the battle staff to have an established RMP 
prior to the arrival ofNESG Seven. The operating environment is expected to be aggressive (US 
forces to be challenged by PRC forces) but non-hostile. 
Scenario Three (Stressing Scenario) 
The PRC is showing little interest in removing military forces from the island of Palawan. 
International outcry continues to escalate in the United Nations as PRC forces continue to flow 
into the region. The PRC is warning that US or coalition forces massing in and around the 
Celebes or Philippine Sea region are to be subject to " ... appropriate defensive measures." 
Backing words with action, interdiction of shipping by heavy PRC submarine and surface vessels 
is commencing in the Sulu, Celebes, and Philippine Seas. As Deprivation looms larger over the 
Palawan horizon, cries for international intervention are becoming more persistent. In response, 
four ASEAN nations -- Singapore, Japan, the Phillipines, and Indonesia -- are supplying 
coalition troops and equipment. The mission of CJTF SEA Tiger, the designated commander for 
Operation Crouching Tiger, is now being modified to re-establishing Philippine sovereignty over 
Palawan, NCA is directing COMP AC to commence combat operations when ready. 
One PRC infantry division is entrenching itself northeast of Puerta Princessa with the 
maritime division, supported by components of the artillery division, fortifying the harbor 
region. The remaining PRC troops are dispersing throughout the mountains southwest of Puerta 
Princessa and the mid-island gap. The PRC's remaining Sovremenny DDGs are rendezvousing 
with the PRC Carrier 40 nm northwest of Palawan. J-2 assesses PRC forces in the area to be as 




Table 6 shows type and number of threats present in each scenario. In the benign scenario 
all threats are present at the start of the simulation. In the nominal and stressing scenarios, all 
ships and submarines are also generated at the start of the simulation, but waves of aircraft and 
ASCM launchers appear in hour and half-hour intervals, respectively. Each wave is an 
associated missile swarm. 
Table 6. PRC Military Deployment in Scenarios One, Two, and Three 
Scenario 1 Generator IBen!.g_n Scenario _l 
Outr:>_ut TimeJ:min Threat "'[yQ_e]feIT Valuefil 
Scenario Generator 3l5tressinJ!.. Scenariol 
Output TimeJ:mi~ Threat i:ype]feff ValueJ:# 
0.5 3x PGM 3 0.5 DOG 18 
0.5 Diesel Sub 2 0.5 FFG 10 
0.5 3x PGM 7 
Scenario 2 Generator J_Nominal Scenari~ 0.5 Diesel Sub 13 
Output Time_(min Threat "Ii'.Pe J!"e!}_ Valuej#j_ 0.5 NucSub 5 
0.5 DOG 3 0.5 Mini Sub 5 
0.5 FFG 10 0.5 Mine Field 5 
0.5 3xPGM 10 10 MIG-31 (Fighter) 25 
0.5 MIG-31ff_ig_hted_ 6 10 SU-30 J:Bomber) 20 
0.5 SU-30 J_Bomber}_ 6 10 Missile 100 
0.5 Missile 5 10 Mine Field 5 
0.5 Diesel Sub 5 10 ASCM Launcher 50 
0.5 Nuc Sub 5 40 MIG-31 _(Fighter) 25 
0.5 Mine Field 10 40 SU-30 J:Bomber) 20 
0.5 ASCM Launcher 5 40 Missile 100 
120 MIG-31 _{F_ig_hter}_ 6 40 Mine Field 5 
120 SU-30~ombed_ 8 40 ASCM Launcher 50 
120 Missile 5 70 MIG-31 (Fighter) 25 
120 ASCM Launcher 5 70 SU-30 (Bomber) 20 
240 MIG-31 ff_ig_hted_ 4 70 Missile 100 
240 SU-30 J_Bombed_ 8 70 Mine Field 5 
240 Missile 10 70 ASCM Launcher 50 
240 ASCM Launcher 10 100 MIG-31 (Fighter) 25 
300 MIG-31 l_F!_g_hter}_ 4 100 SU-30 (Bomber) 20 
300 SU-30 J:Bom bed_ 8 100 Missile 100 
100 Mine Field 5 
100 ASCM Launcher 50 
Stood up aboard NESG Seven, CJTF has designated all available forces to proceed to 
battlefield preparation phases with possible continuity towards engagement of the enemy. 
Specific tasking to deployed forces includes, but not limited to: Identify covertly safe water 
access routes to selected beach positions evaluating enemy defensive measures and force 
composition; identify target priorities and classify enemy MIW assets and hazards, with 
recommended options for neutralization of mines, to include plans for maintaining possible 
routes of access for follow-on expeditionary forces; develop prioritized mission area target lists 
for execution and include recommendations for organic battle damage assessment; confirm PRC 
submarine operating areas south and east of Palawan; prepare to support follow-on SEA 
STRIKE operations through target designation and prosecution activities related to PRC land, 
air, ground, surface and subsurface units. 
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Figure 7. Scenario Hostility 
SIMULATIVE STUDY 
A cornerstone of the SoS development process, the simulative study, which is a Monte 
Carlo analysis using modeling and simulation, provides quantitative measures to assess the 
effectiveness of the alternative SoS architectures. Assessing the effectiveness of an alternative 
SoS architecture amounts to answering the following questions: 
1. How much time does it require to establish the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP)? 
2. How well does it engage threats? 
3. How well does it protect personnel from risk? 
4. How well does it endure combat? 
An architecture and a scenario constitute a configuration. The fifty-four SoS architectures 
and the three distinct scenarios defined above give rise to one hundred and sixty-two 
configurations that are subject to the Monte Carlo analysis. Fifty Monte Carlo runs are made per 
configuration. 
Figure 8 captures the scope of the modeling and simulation and analysis in the 
simulative study. The input to the study includes the SoS force compositions and the scenarios. 
Again, each scenario is represented by the parameters that describe the physical objects in an 
SoS architecture and in an opposing force, and the operating environment. The physical objects 
are all surface, air, subsurface, and land platforms as well as major cruise missiles and mines. A 
physical object is characterized by its speed, tum radius, endurance, sensor range, sensor 
probability of detection, and weapon probability of kill. The simulated geography and the 
physical climate of an operating area constitute the operating environment, which is represented 
by terrain type, altitude, depth, atmospherics, and other ambient conditions. · 
The process models represent the essential SoS functions, namely, Surveillance/Threat 
Analysis & Evaluation, Battle Management, Communications, and Engagement. Reflecting the 
functional decomposition, these processes are decomposed to sub-processes. 
Surveillance/Threat Analysis & Evaluation breaks down to Detection, Localization, Tracking, 




Establish Links and Transmit; and Engagement to Engage Threats and Attrition. The 





























Risk to Personnel 
Endurance 




~~.::")<>---&! ~ T;mo To 
Detection 
Data 
Figure 9. Simulative Study Modeling Interfaces 
• 
The simulation produces the performance measures such as the recognized maritime 
picture (RMP), engagement, risk to personnel, and SoS endurance. The simulative study output 
will be described in detail below. 
Modeling and Simulation 
We employ three simulation tools -- the Engineering Physics-Based Excel models 
combined with the Shallow Water Acoustics Toolset (SWAT), the Autonomous Littoral Warfare 
Systems Evaluator - Monte Carlo (ALWSE-MC), and the Force/Theater Extend™ model -- to 
produce the desired performance measures. Fig. 9 shows the interfaces between the modeling 
tools. 
Engineering Physics-Based Models (Excel/SW AT) 
An Excel model combined with the Shallow Water Acoustics Toolset (SWAT), the 
Engineering Physics-Based models create high fidelity, limited breadth models of physical 
phenomena for sensor/threat pairs. It creates data tables for the Force/Theater Extend™ model 
and sensor/threat pair probability of detection vs. range (lateral-range) curves for AL WSE-MC. 
• ALWSE-MC 
• 
With the probability-of-detection curves (i.e., probability vs. range) for sensor/target pairs 
provided by the ExceV SWAT models, ALWSE-MC, a discrete event simulation tool that can 
run in batch or interactive modes, produces the time-to-detection of a target (static or mobile) by 
a sensor, for undersea, surface, and air missions. Each search platform is given an initial 
position, a search area, and a search pattern (fixed or random). Search patterns can be a 
diminishing square, ladder, uniform coverage, or user-defined waypoints (Gilman 2004). 
Operational experience underlines the following assumptions made with running AL WYS-
MC. A search area for each mission is based on a typical operating area, potentially covered by 
each search platform. Search speeds are either provided by operators or obtained from open 
sources and have no correlation to the maximum speed of the platform. Each target has a 
different amount of time between turns. For example, the highly maneuverable guided missile 
patrol boat (PGM) turns every five to ten minutes, while the guided missile destroyer (DDG) 
turned every thirty to forty minutes. Each search vehicle has unlimited endurance. The 
detection time can't thus exceed platform endurance. Search platforms and targets are confined 
to the search area. The targets thus can't leave the search area to avoid detection. Each platform 
carries only one sensor. The probability-of-detection curves used in AL WSE-MC are generated 
using physics based models and open sources. 




The low-fidelity Force/Theater Level Model focuses on the high level SoS functions and 
implements the interactions between opposing forces, and examines the effects of changing the 
SoS force structure and architectural attributes on maritime dominance. Extend™ , Version 6, a 
discrete event simulation tool developed by Imagine That, Inc. (Imagine That 2002), is used to 
develop the Force/Theater Level Model. 
The model design and process algorithms discussed below are incorporated in the 
Force/Theater Extend™ model, which is built in layers. The layered design keeps the upper 
layers of the model free from unnecessary amounts of detail and groups relevant model processes 
together. Figure 10 shows the top layer of the five-layer Force/Theater Extend™ model. In this 
top layer, each process model is represented by a hierarchical block, which contains the lower 
underlying layer model. The input module pulls the design variables from the run matrix for 
utilization throughout the model. The output module consolidates all parameters necessary to 
produce the performance measures. 
In addition to the SoS force compositions, the threat characteristics, and the scenarios, the 
Force/Theater Extend™ model also needs the probabilities of kill P(K) of the various SoS 
weapons against the targets, the number of engagements and its uncertainty the SoS platform is 
allowed before a threat returns fire (which depend on the sensor and weapon capabilities of SoS 
and the kinematical characteristics of the threat platforms). It also needs the number of channels 
for SHF, UHF, VHF, and ELF (based on the available channels used in the fleet) and for the 
broadband 802.11 spectrum, link capacities, communication hops, connection path lengths, and 
platform connectivity and the communication medium. These additional data can be found in 
Appendix A. 
The assumptions inherent in the Force/Theater Level Extend™ model follow. All SoS 
sensors can detect and track multiple targets simultaneously, classify and identify targets 
perfectly, and process their own data (so as to avoid transmitting of large amounts of raw data 
over the communications network). The link capacity is limited by the sending/receiving 
platform capabilities only at the furthest hop from the C2 node. All intermediate hops use VHF 
or UHF. Weapon kill probability P(K), rather than time to engage, is assumed to be the 
dominant factor. SoS platforms engage all enemy platforms first. A missile threat implies an 
enemy first strike. Input data into the Force/Theater Level Extend Model comes from the SoS 
force compositions and the scenarios. 
Surveillance/Threat Analysis & Evaluation (S/TA&E) Algorithm 
The S/T A&E model simulates searching for a target by multiple SoS sensors. Using the 
sensor-target pair data from ALWSE-MC, the S/TA&E algorithm determines the time to detect a 
target to be the smallest value of the shortest times to target detection (TTD). This time 
represents the total time required to search for and find the target upon its arrival in the operating 
area. The difference between the shortest TTD and the third shortest TTD is the time to localize 
the target. This represents the time required to de-conflict multiple detections of the same target 
and to triangulate the target position. After localization, all three sensors with the shortest TTD 
begin to track the target. The time to track a target by a sensor is given by T """ = 9(: *)'At , 




engage the target, and L\t the track rate (Huynh 1984). The total time to track the target also 
accounts for the time ofreceipt of the track report by the C2 node. 
Communications Algorithm 
Either a track report from the S/T A&E model or an engagement order from the battle 
management model activates the communications model. In either case the communications 
algorithm determines the sending and receiving platforms. The connecting path length is the 
distance between the sending and receiving platform and is a function of the platform type, 
platform physical distribution (network diameter), and SoS C2 structure. The number of hops or 
message relays required to cover the connecting path is dependent on the type of platform and its 
link capacity, the SoS communications network architecture, and the SoS C2 structure. For each 
hop the type of communication link is selected based on the communication capability of a 
specific platform type for a given communications network architecture. A link with the highest 
available data rate is selected. All messages wait in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue for 
transmission with a transmission time based on the link data rate. 
Battle Management Algorithm 
The Battle Management algorithm sorts SoS weapons by mission area and then pairs a 
target with the weapon with the highest P(K) for that target. It then issues and sends 
engagement orders to the Communications model. Once the SoS platform associated with the 
paired weapon receives the engagement order, the target/weapon pair is sent to the Engagement 
model. 
Engagement Algorithm 
SoS platforms generally engage all enemy platforms first. However, in the case of a 
missile attack, which signifies an enemy first strike, the SoS platform will also shoot at the 
incoming missile. The number of shots taken by an SoS platform before the threat returns fire is 
dependent on the threat type. The SoS platform and the target type determine the time to engage 
and the SoS P(K). If the target survives, it will be either re-engaged or return fire. Except for a 
few special cases such as missiles or mines, a threat targets the SoS platform firing at it or the 
last SoS platform that fires a shot. The threat type and SoS platform type determines the time to 
engage process delay and the threat P(K). If the SoS platform is destroyed, the threat then 
targets another SoS platform. If the SoS platform survives it gets another chance to engage. 
Also, the Engagement algorithm calculates casualties and personnel exposed to risk, using the 
maximum number of personnel manning a SoS platform in Table 7 and the following rules. A 
destroyed SoS platform results in all personnel killed. In the stressing scenario, all destroyed 
SoS platforms result in casualties. In the nominal scenario, twenty-five to thirty-five percent of 
the SoS platforms are destroyed resulting in casualties. In the benign scenario, all SoS platforms 
that are hit result only in personnel exposed to risk. Also, an engagement ends with an SoS 
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Figure 10. Top Layer of Force/Theater Extend™ Model 
Experiment Design 
The experiment design determines the architectures and the required number of simulation 
runs. Again, the design variables include the three force compositions (manned only, balanced 
hybrid, primarily unmanned), the three scenarios (benign, nominal, stressing), and the three 
CNAs (enclave, hybrid, distributed), two C2 structures (centralized, decentralized), and three 
PPDs (small, medium, wide). There are thus a total of one hundred and sixty-two possible 
configurations. Fifty Monte Carlo runs of the one hundred and sixty-two configurations result in 
a total of eight thousand and one hundred runs. 
Output 
Different types of measures of performance (MOP) generated by the Force/Theater Level 
Extend™ simulation are used in the calculation of measures of effectiveness (MOE), which are 
in tum used in assessing the simulative study objectives. Table 7 shows an example of the 
Extend™ output matrix. Table 8 captures the mapping of the MOP to each of the MOE. The 
Force/Theater Level Extend™ output consists of one hundred and sixty-two thousand data 
points, which are the numerical values of the measures of performance (MOP) resulting from the 
eight thousand and one hundred runs. The analysis of these Extend™ output data will be 
discussed as a part of the architecture ranking. 
FORCE COMPOSITION and ARCHITECTURE RANKING 
The architecture ranking process consists of an analysis of the Extend™ output data, force 
composition selection and ranking, and architecture selection and ranking . 
• Force/Theater Level Extend™ Data Analysis 
• 
• 
Processing of the fifty data points per configuration then results in one hundred and sixty-
two data points for each MOP and thereby reduces the total data points from eight hundred and 
sixty-two thousand data points from the Force/Theater Level Extend™ simulation to three 
thousand and two hundred and forty. The measures of effectiveness (MOE) are then computed 
from these MOP data. Since there are one hundred and sixty-two configurations, there are one 
hundred and sixty-two values for each MOE. The resulting data, called the processed Extend 
data, are input to the force composition and architecture ranking, which is discussed next. 
Table 7. Extend Output Matrix 
Total COis COis Enemy Weapons Total Personnel Total Sos sos Time to MaxRMP Config COis Detected Localized Targets Fired Personnel Exposed Casualties Platforms Platforms Max RMP Ratio & Killed to Risk Killed Ratio (hrs) 
1 5 5 5 3 5 9755 0 0 106 0 0.569 1 
2 133 133 133 10 36 9755 129 455 106 3 28.905 1 
3 858 858 858 47 137 9755 0 8393 106 9 30.507 1 
4 5 5 5 4 5 9755 0 0 106 0 1.501 1 
5 133 133 133 130 151 9755 493 646 106 2 28.533 1 
6 858 858 858 14 78 9755 0 7377 106 6 32.267 1 
7 5 5 5 3 4 9755 0 0 106 0 0.570 1 
8 133 133 133 21 46 9755 323 728 106 2 28.599 1 
9 858 858 858 279 469 9755 0 9283 106 40 30.588 1 
10 5 5 5 4 4 9755 0 0 106 0 0.570 1 
11 133 133 133 9 24 9755 2 129 106 1 28.090 1 
12 858 858 858 226 398 9755 0 9296 106 50 38.714 1 
13 5 5 5 4 4 9755 0 0 106 0 0.570 1 
14 133 133 133 129 175 9755 544 1652 106 4 28.962 1 
15 858 858 858 12 75 9755 0 2194 106 5 30.676 1 
16 5 5 5 2 4 9755 0 0 106 0 1.157 1 
17 133 133 133 109 136 9755 801 0 106 0 27.629 1 
18 858 858 858 251 402 9755 0 9412 106 35 29.236 1 
19 5 5 5 4 4 9755 0 0 106 0 0.570 1 
20 133 133 133 19 48 9755 452 0 106 0 28.600 1 
Table 8. MOP-to-MOE Mapping 
Measures of Effectiveness Measures of Performance 
Surveillance Average time to establish the RMP 
Risk Exposure Personnel Exposed to Risk 
Casualties Number of Casualties 
Average time to establish the RM P 
RMP Capability 
Percentage of RM P Established 
Communications Capability Average Message Transmission Time 
Number of Enemy Platforms Killed 
Combat Effectiveness 
Number of Shots Fired By Sos 
Number of Enemy Platforms Killed 
Engagement Capability Total Number of Enemy Platforms 
Average time to Kill Enemy Platforms 
Number of SoS platforms Killed 
Friendly Endurance 
Total Number of Sos platforms 
Number of Enemy Platforms Killed 
Enemy Endurance 




The force composition ranking process starts with the calculation of normalized utility 
scores for each MOE/configuration pair, using the processed Extend data above, and ends with 
the force composition ranking results. The normalized utility score for each configuration is the 
weighted sum of the normalized utility scores, the weights being the weights assigned to the 
MOE. There are thus one hundred and sixty-two scores, one for each configuration. The 
ensuing step in this process partitions each configuration by scenario, resulting in fifty-four 
architectures for each of the three scenarios, and ranks the architectures per scenario according to 
the utility scores. The next step determines the average utility score for each force composition 
within a scenario. Each average utility score of each force composition is then normalized so 
the total maximum utility score attained per scenario is one. Now, for each force composition, 
its normalized utility scores are multiplied by the respective scenario weights and the obtained 
results are added, thus resulting in a single utility score. Finally, these utility scores are ranked 
and the best force composition is one with the highest score. 
Figure 11 shows the force composition ranking results. The balanced hybrid of manned 
and unmanned systems or Force Composition Two performs better than the other two force 
compositions, the primarily manned Force Composition One and the primarily unmanned Force 
Composition Three. 
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It is observed that a nominal unmanned to manned platform ratio of approximately 1.5 to 1 
appears to result in a better performance than does a higher ratio. The ratio of approximately 4 
to 1 used by Force Composition Three results in a decrease in the overall SoS performance. 
Architecture Ranking 
Recall that the attributes of each architecture are the force composition, communications 
network architecture, command and control structure, and physical platform distribution. The 
architecture ranking process is similar to the force composition ranking process in that both 
processes are identical up to the calculation of the total utility score for each configuration and 
their partitioning by scenario. The normalized utility score for each configuration is the 




MOE. There are thus one hundred and sixty-two scores, one for each configuration. Summing 
these one hundred and sixty-two scores over the scenarios produces fifty-four scenario-
independent utility scores, one per architecture. 
Now, selecting the best architecture means selecting a superior force composition in 
conjunction with the most effective communications architecture network, command and control 
structure and physical platform distribution. Figure 12 shows the three top performance 
architectures - (1,3,2,1), (2,3,2,2), and (3,3,2,3). 
Commnication Commnd and Control Platform Physical Distribution 
Architecture Enclave Hybrid Distributed Centralli7.ed Decentraliz.ed Smdl Medium Large 
Architecture 1 x x x 
Architecture 2 x x x 
Architecture 3 x x x 
Figure 12. Architecture Performance Results 
From the study results, the enclave, hybrid and distributed communications network 
architectures show statistical difference when applied to the various MOE. The distributed 
communications network architecture is the preferred choice for all three of the top performing 
architectures. The ability for almost all SoS platforms to communicate with each other reduces 
the average message delay between reporting units and receiving units. The distributed 
communication network architecture (CNA) has an average message delay that is one tenth that 
of the hybrid CNA and one hundredth that of the enclave CNA. The distributed CNA also 
results in a minimum effect on message throughput when communication nodes are lost. 
The command and control (C2) structures are also statistically significant in deciding the 
best performance of the selected architectures. The top architectures all employ the 
decentralized C2 structure, which allows for a faster dissemination of command messages, due to 
the proximity of C2 nodes to sensor or reporting platforms. The average command message 
delay of a decentralized structure is one tenth that of the centralized structure. The decentralized 
C2 also results in faster reaction times than those architectures with a centralized C2 structure, 
also a result of the command and control nodes being in a closer proximity to the forward 
deployed platforms. Furthermore, more C2 nodes in an SoS results in a decrease in network 
demand and single node workload. The final benefit of a decentralized C2 structure is the 
elimination of a single point of failure. If a C2 node is lost in decentralized system, its function 
can be picked up by another C2 node. In a centralized system the lost of a single node would be 
catastrophic. Decentralized command and control thus increases system survivability and 
reliability. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We also perform an independent statistical analysis on the raw Force/Theater Level 
Extend™ simulation data (MOP) to identify the best performance SoS architecture (i.e., one that 




architecture, and thereby validate the architecture ranking and selection with respect to 
architecture performance, attribute effects, and cost effectiveness. We consider the following 
MOE: RMP capability, engagement capability, risk to personnel, and battle endurance. 
Architecture Performance 
The RMP capability is reflected by the time to establish the RMP; the engagement 
capability by the percentage of enemy platforms destroyed; risk to personnel by the total lives 
put at risk and casualties; and battle endurance by the percentage of SoS surviving platforms. 
The number of personnel varies with force composition. 
The ranking analysis above finds that Configuration 105 (corresponding to Force 
Composition Two), Configuration 162 (corresponding to Force Composition Three) and 
Configuration 48 (corresponding to Force Composition One) perform the best in Scenario Three 
across all MOE. This statistical analysis finds that Configuration 108 (which corresponds to 
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Figure 13. CDF for Establishing the Recognized Maritime Picture 
As shown by Figure 13, which displays the cumulative density function (CDF) for the time 
to establish the RMP for the respective configurations, Force Composition Two is comparable to 
the best RMP performing force composition, in that the probability that the difference in RMP 
capability between the two configurations is only one hour falls between 80% and 90%. The 
primarily unmanned and manned compositions exhibit considerably poor performance -- a four 
and five hour difference, respectively, from the best performing force composition 
(configuration). While not shown here, the CDF for the time to establish the RMP remains 
consistent for the other scenarios. 
Except for engagement capability, the selected force composition is comparable to the best 
performing force composition in the most stressing scenario for all MOE. While the manned 
only force composition is comparable to the best performance force composition in engagement 
capability, the mixed hybrid architecture has considerably poorer performance (less than 60% 






















CDF of Attributes for Engagement 
Architecture 2, Scenario 3 








Figure 14. Effects of Architecture Attributes on Engagement 
We now assess the effects of the architecture attributes (CNA, C2, and PPD) on the 
performance of the SoS architectures. For Force Composition Two and Scenario Three, the 
CDF of the kill ratio (representing engagement capability) in Figure 14 indicates that the 
architecture attributes of distributed CNA, centralized C2, and small PPD outperform the other 
attribute combinations. These CDF provide insight into which attributes are aiding in SoS 
success and provide insight into which attributes and architectures should be tested for statistical 
differences. 
For combat endurance and communications performance, however, no conclusion can be 
made as to which attributes contribute to architecture success. Finally, while no single attribute 
could be established as the dominant factor in performance for combat endurance, the distributed 
CNA and decentralized C2 do contribute to communications performance (SEA5 2004). 
Data Quality Assessment 
We also assess the quality of the simulation data using box plots for the MOE. As shown 
by the box plot on the left in Figure 15, the tight distribution of the time-to-establish-RMP data 
for each force composition indicates good quality in the data. The box plot on the right indicates 
a statistical difference between all three force compositions and the mix hybrid architecture with 
the lowest times to establish the RMP. For Force Composition Two, Figure 16 indicates small 
spread in the data, again ascertaining the good quality of the data. While not shown here, the 
same behavior is exhibited with the other force compositions, with respect to the time to 
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Figure 16. Time to Establish RMP Dispersion 
RECOMMENDED Sos ARCHITECTURE 
Based on a cost model developed during this work (SEAS 2004) and the cost data obtained 
from open sources and the Defense Automated Cost Information System (DACIMS) provided by 
the Pentagon, the total ownership cost (TOC) of each system of systems is the sum of the costs 
of operation and support (O&S) and purchase of the platforms in the SoS. Table 9 shows the 
TOC for the three force compositions. The underlying costing method uses a basis of a ten-year 
lifecycle to standardize costs across the different platforms and provides a point estimate only; 
no variance of the data is taken into account. The cost estimate, however, will adjust itself if the 
lifecycle of the platforms is adjusted. Finally, the unmanned platform costs are estimated using 
an analogy technique (SEAS 2004). 
Figure 17 shows that the mix hybrid force composition is both cost effective and cost 
efficient. The manned only force composition is shown to be cost effective and not cost 




(neither cost effective nor efficient). In fact, for Force Composition Three, cost increases while 
performance degrades. 
The independent statistical analysis shows that the selected balanced hybrid force 
composition (FC 2) is in excellent agreement with the best performance force composition in the 
stressing scenario. The mix hybrid force composition clearly outperforms the other alternatives 
with respect to RMP establishment, risk to personnel, and communications capability. The 
distributed communications network architecture and decentralized command and control 
contribute to superior SoS performance. 
The recommended SoS architecture for the 200 nm by 200 nm littoral operating area is thus 
(2,3,2,2); that is, a balanced hybrid system of manned and unmanned systems that are physically 
distributed in a 100-nm diameter area and that uses a distributed communications network and a 
decentralized command and control structure. 
Cost in FY04$B 
Architecture Purchase Cost O&S TOC 
Manned Only 0 1.53 23 
(Force Comp 1) 
Balanced Hybrid 4.7 1.34 24.3 
(Force Comp 2) 
Primarily Unmanned 10.4 1.13 25.8 
(Force Comp 3) 
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In this work we define the alternatives of a conceptual system of systems (SoS) and to 
recommend a cost-effective SoS architecture that would enable SEA BASING and SEA STRIKE 
for maritime dominance in the littorals in the 2020 timeframe. The SoS would consist of sea-
based, land-based, an airborne sensor and weapon systems that are (i) both manned and 
unmanned, (ii) in existence, in development, and future concepts, and (iii) networked via 
communications links and space systems to achieve success of the following littoral missions in 
an operating area of 200 nm inland by 200 nm offshore in the South China Sea, with the 
minimum risk to personnel: (1) Establishment of the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP); (2) 
Identification and, if necessary, reduction of hostile threats to within capability of the sea base; 
and (3) enabling projection of offensive capabilities from the sea. 
Three SoS force compositions are considered: only manned platforms, primarily unmanned 
platforms, and a balanced manned and unmanned platforms. According to the findings in this 
work, enabling SEA BASING and SEA STRIKE for achieving maritime dominance in the 
littorals in the 2020 timeframe in a cost effective manner requires a balanced hybrid system of 
manned and unmanned systems that uses a distributed communications network and a 
decentralized command and control structure. The distributed communications network provides 
for faster dissemination of information and shorter message delay while decentralized command 
and control reduces single-node workload and prevents C2 collapse in the event of C2 node loss. 
Furthermore, the longest distance between two platforms in a deployed SoS is called the 
diameter of the distribution of the SoS platforms. For this 200- nm by 200-nm littoral operating 
area, the 100-nm diameter hybrid SoS is recommended. The 50-nm and 150-nm diameters have 
not been found to significantly improve SoS performance. Finally, unmanned platforms 
complement but cannot replace manned systems. 
The findings of this study thus suggest that a system of only unmanned platforms does not 
provide a silver-bullet solution to the problem of maritime dominance in the littorals in 2020 
time frame; unmanned platforms thus complement but cannot replace manned systems. Manned 
platforms will still be required to implement command and control and make crucial operational 
decisions. As unmanned vehicles in the 2020 timeframe by themselves will not have the ability 
to adapt to dynamic threat environments, manned platforms will remain an essential command 
and control element in military force structures. Furthermore, limited in endurance and thereby 
requiring manned system support, unmanned vehicles cannot completely keep personnel out of 
harm's way, yet they greatly reduce the level of risk to which personnel are exposed. 
While the findings of this integrated project provide some insight into the SoS solution to 
the problem of maritime dominance in the littorals in the 2020 timeframe, further research is 
needed to provide additional insight and to assess the robustness of the findings. We recommend 
the following future research activities: 
• Develop an efficient approach to consider a wide range of force compositions 
(unmanned/manned platform mixes) and determine an optimal force composition. 
• Develop and implement composite tracking algorithms and multi-sensor fusion 
algorithms and assess the performance of an SoS in multiple-target tracking and 




• Implement standard and military network access protocols in the EXTEND™ simulation 
and assess the throughput and delay of data and command messages. 
• Implement many-on-many engagement algorithms in an appropriate simulation to 
determine an optimal force size against postulated threats and to assess combat 
effectiveness of an SoS. 
• Include space-based sensors and communications satellites in an SoS and assess its 
contribution to the SoS effectiveness. 
• Incorporate concepts of operations (CONOPS) in the Extend™ simulation or in any other 
appropriate simulation to determine their impact on the performance of an SoS. 
• Take into account the reliability of unmanned vehicles in order to determine an optimal 
number of unmanned vehicles in a hybrid SoS and to establish its operational logistics. 
• Incorporate realistic models of infrared sensors, acoustic sensors, and radar, in particular, 
foliage penetration radar, and related processing algorithms in an SoS simulation in order 
to assess their collective impact on detection and tracking in littoral operating 
environments. 
• Incorporate realistic models of littoral environments (e.g., clutter models) in an SoS 
simulation in order to assess performance accuracy of the sensors above and thereby the 
effectiveness of an SoS. 
• Implement decision-making algorithms at command and control nodes in the EXTEND™ 
simulation in order to assess the SoS reaction time and battle management effectiveness. 
• Conduct the study carried out in this project with entirely different littoral environments 
(such as in the Middle East) in order to determine an optimal SoS composition for 
various environments . 
• Conduct a cost analysis in order to provide estimates on a total ownership cost and its 
variability for each SoS. 
• Incorporate UV reliability measures into appropriate simulations in order to optimize the 
number of UV s necessary to meet operational requirements and to evaluate SoS 
performance. 
• Perform the study carried out in this project using pertinent classified data and 
information in order to provide realistic assessment of the performance of the SoS and 
thereby to aid decision makers in developing and implementing an operational SoS. 
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• APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL FORCE/THEATER EXTEND™ INPUT 
The following tables contain the additional input to the Force/Theater Extend™ model. 
Table 10. SoS Architecture Times to Engage 
SoS Platform TTEiminI 
SoSPlatformT_1Pe Surface Tar:g_et Air Tar:g_et Subsurf Tar:g_et Mine Tar:g_et Land Tar:g_et 
CVN 1.9 
CG 4.3 1.9 9.1 5.7 
CGX 4.3 1.9 9.1 5.7 
DOG 4.3 1.9 9.1 5.7 
DDX 4.3 1.9 9.1 5.7 
LCS 4.3 1.9 9.1 75.0 




SSN 9.1 9.1 5.7 
P-3 4.3 9.1 
MMA 4.3 9.1 
SH-60 0.3 9.1 
MH-53 75.0 
F/A-18 4.3 0.7 5.0 
• 





JSF 4.3 0.7 5.0 
F-16 4.3 0.7 5.0 
F-22 4.3 0.7 5.0 
S-3 4.3 9.1 
SSGN 9.1 9.1 5.7 
USV-1 
USV-2 0.3 75.0 
UAV-4 4.3 5.0 
UAV-5 0.3 0.3 
ASW UUV 9.1 9.1 
• 
• 
Table 11. SoS Architecture P(K) 
Surface P(K) Mine P(K) 
SoSWe'!.e_on~e DOG FFG PGM SoSWeap_onType Mine 
Ha!:E_oon 0.3 0.3 0.6 EODTeam 0.95 
Torpedo 0.6 0.6 0.8 MH-53 Sled 0.6 
JSOW 0.3 0.3 0.8 USV Sled 0.6 
Pel]l_uin 0.3 0.3 0.6 
LCS Gun 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Hellfire 0.05 0.1 0.3 
AirP(K) Land P(K) 
SoSWeap_onT_}p_e Fig_hter Bomber Missile SoSWeap_on~e ASCM Launcher 
SM-2 0.85 0.85 0.7 Tomahawk 0.85 
RAM 0.85 0.85 0.7 JSOW 0.7 
Sea ~arrow 0.85 0.85 0.7 Hellfire 0.6 
AIM-9X 0.7 0.7 0 JDAM 0.7 
HARM 0.7 
Subsurface P(K) 
SoSWeap_on~eI Diesel Sub I Nuc Sub I Mini Sub 
Torpedo 1 0.6 1 0.7 l 0.8 
Table 12. SoS ArchitectureEngagements 
• 
Number of En_g_"!9.ements 
Threat Type Misses I#} 
DOG 2 +/-1 
FFG 2 +/-1 
PGM 2 +/-1 
F!.g_hter 3 +/-1 
Bomber 3 +/-1 
Missile 1or2 
Diesel Sub 2 or3 
Nuc Sub 2 or3 
Mini Sub 2 or3 
Mine 1 
Missile Launcher 2 
• 
• 
Table 13. Sensor Time To Track Data 
Surface Sensor Mine Sensor 
SoSSensorType S_!g_ma _im_l_ DeltaTiseq SoSSensorType S!_g_maim} Delta T ]sectl: 
EF-Band 7.40048 1 Surf 762.5 0.5 
K-Band 0.014781 1 Helo 653.6 0.5 
X-Band 0.014781 1 uuv 183 0.5 
AN/SPS 67 60.3472 0.083 
AN/SPS 55 38.751 0.083 
Air Borne B-Band 0.44751 30 
EF +IR 7.40048 1 
AN/SPS 550 + 67 38.751 0.083 
~N/SPS 550 + 67 + TI 38.751 0.083 Land Sensor 
B-BandD 1.65704 30 SoSSensorType l S_!g_majm_l_ l Delta T jsectl_ 
IR 3.5 1 Fol Pen I 10 I 0.1 
Air Sensor 
SoSSensorType Sigma (m) Delta T (sec) 
EF-Band 11.2778 1 Threats 
K-Band 0.035496 1 Threat Type S_!g_ma*_(nm_l_ 
X-Band 0.035496 1 DOG 0.5 
AN/SPS 49 198.794 0.083 FFG 0.5 
B-Band 5995.91 30 PGM 0.5 
B-BandD 18960.7 30 Fighter 1 
Bomber 1 
Subsurface Sensor Missile 1 
SoSSensorType S!g_ma]m} Delta T Isectl: Diesel Sub 0.8 
Surf 190.625 0.5 Nuc Sub 0.8 
• 
Sub 762.5 0.5 
P3 500 0.5 
uuv 381.25 0.5 
Mini Sub 0.8 
Mine 0.02 
Missile Launcher 1 
Table 14. Communication Link and Message Parameters 
Comms Link Generator Mess'!9_es 
Comm Link Channels J.#} Data Rate IKbpsI Type SizeJbits 
802.11 27 2000 Track Re_Q_ort 704 
SHF 80 105 Kill Assessment 256 
UHF 79 0.81 Engagement Order 192 
VHF 36 0.44 
ELF 2 0.6 
• 
• 
Table 15. Communication Hops 
Enclave H~s~ Hybrid Hops #j Distributed Ho s(#) 
SoSPlatform Centralized Decentralized SoSPlatform Centralized Decentralized SoSPlatform Centralized Decentralized 
CVN 0 0 CVN 0 0 CVN 0 0 
CG 1 1 CG 1 1 CG 1 1 
CGX 1 1 CGX 1 1 CGX 1 1 
DOG 1 1 DOG 1 1 DOG 1 1 
DDX 1 1 DDX 1 1 DDX 1 1 
LCS 2 1 LCS 2 1 LCS 1 1 
FFG 2 1 FFG 2 1 FFG 1 1 
MHC 2 1 MHC 2 1 MHC 1 1 
MCM 2 1 MCM 2 1 MCM 1 1 
LHA 1 1 LHA 1 1 LHA 1 1 
SSN 2 2 SSN 2 2 SSN 1 1 
E-2C 1 1 E-2C 1 1 E-2C 1 1 
E-8 1 1 E-8 1 1 E-8 1 1 
E-3 1 1 E-3 1 1 E-3 1 1 
P-3 1 1 P-3 1 1 P-3 1 1 
MMA 1 1 MMA 1 1 MMA 1 1 
SH-60 2 1 SH-60 2 1 SH-60 1 1 
MH-53 3 2 MH-53 3 2 MH-53 1 1 
F/A-18 1 1 F/A-18 1 1 F/A-18 1 1 
F-14 1 1 F-14 1 1 F-14 1 1 
E/A-6B 1 1 E/A-6B 1 1 E/A-6B 1 1 
B-2 2 1 B-2 2 1 B-2 2 1 
B-52 2 1 B-52 2 1 B-52 2 1 
F-117 2 1 F-117 2 1 F-117 2 1 
JSF 2 1 JSF 2 1 JSF 2 1 
F-16 2 1 F-16 2 1 F-16 2 1 
F-22 2 1 F-22 2 1 F-22 2 1 
S-3 1 1 S-3 1 1 S-3 1 1 
SSGN 2 1 SSGN 2 1 SSGN 1 1 
• 
USV-1 3 2 
USV-2 3 2 
UAV-1 2 1 
USV-1 2 1 
USV-2 2 1 
UAV-1 2 1 
USV-1 2 1 
USV-2 2 1 
UAV-1 2 1 
UAV-2 4 2 UAV-2 3 2 UAV-2 2 1 
UAV-3 4 2 UAV-3 3 2 UAV-3 2 1 
UAV-4 4 2 UAV-4 3 2 UAV-4 2 1 
UAV-5 4 2 UAV-5 3 2 UAV-5 2 1 
MIW UUV 4 2 MIW UUV 3 2 MIW UUV 2 1 
ASW UUV 4 2 ASW UUV 3 2 ASW UUV 2 1 
• 
• 
Table 16. Communication Capability Matrix 
Communication C~abili!Y_ 
SoSPlatformType Enclave Hibrid Distributed 
CVN UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
CG UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
CGX UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
DDG UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
DDX UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
LCS UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
FFG UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
MHC ELF+UHF ELF+UHF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
MCM ELF+UHF ELF+UHF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
LHA UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
SSN ELF+UHF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
E-2C UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
E-8 UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
E-3 UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
P-3 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
MMA UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
SH-60 UHF+SHF UHF+SHF UHF+SHF+802.11 
MH-53 UHF+SHF UHF+SHF UHF+SHF+802.11 
F/A-18 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
F-14 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
E/A-68 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
B-2 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
B-52 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
• 
F-117 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
JSF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
F-16 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
F-22 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
S-3 UHF+VHF UHF+VHF UHF+VHF+SHF+802.11 
SSGN ELF+UHF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF UHF+VHF+SHF+ELF+802.11 
USV-1 VHF VHF+802.11 VHF+802.11 
USV-2 VHF VHF+802.11 VHF+802.11 
UAV-1 UHF+VHF UHF+802.11 UHF+802.11 
UAV-2 UHF UHF+802.11 UHF+802.11 
UAV-3 UHF UHF 802.11 
UAV-4 UHF UHF 802.11 
UAV-5 UHF UHF 802.11 
MIW UUV ELF+UHF ELF+UHF ELF+UHF 
ASW UUV ELF+UHF ELF+UHF ELF+UHF 
• 
• 
Table 17. Communication Link Lengths 
Small PPD CommRa~ J_nm_l Medium PPDCommRan_g_eJ_nm_l_ La!:9_e PPD CommRa~ J_nm_l 
SoSPlatform Centralized Decentralized SoSPlatform Centralized Decentralized SoSPlatform Centralized Decentralized 
CVN 0 0 CVN 0 0 CVN 0 0 
CG 5 2.5 CG 7.5 3.75 CG 10 5 
CGX 5 2.5 CGX 7.5 3.75 CGX 10 5 
DOG 10 5 DOG 15 7.5 DOG 20 10 
DDX 10 5 DDX 15 7.5 DDX 20 10 
LCS 10 5 LCS 15 7.5 LCS 20 10 
FFG 10 5 FFG 15 7.5 FFG 20 10 
MHC 30 15 MHC 45 22.5 MHC 60 30 
MCM 30 15 MCM 45 22.5 MCM 60 30 
LHA 5 2.5 LHA 7.5 3.75 LHA 10 5 
SSN 30 15 SSN 45 22.5 SSN 60 30 
E-2C 10 5 E-2C 15 7.5 E-2C 20 10 
E-8 10 5 E-8 15 7.5 E-8 20 10 
E-3 10 5 E-3 15 7.5 E-3 20 10 
P-3 10 5 P-3 15 7.5 P-3 20 10 
MMA 10 5 MMA 15 7.5 MMA 20 10 
SH-60 5 2.5 SH-60 7.5 3.75 SH-60 10 5 
MH-53 5 2.5 MH-53 7.5 3.75 MH-53 10 5 
F/A-18 50 25 F/A-18 75 37.5 F/A-18 100 50 
F-14 50 25 F-14 75 37.5 F-14 100 50 
E/A-68 50 25 E/A-68 75 37.5 E/A-68 100 50 
8-2 100 50 8-2 150 75 8-2 200 100 
8-52 100 50 8-52 150 75 8-52 200 100 
F-117 100 50 F-117 150 75 F-117 200 100 
• 
JSF 50 25 
F-16 50 25 
F-22 50 25 
JSF 75 37.5 
F-16 75 37.5 
F-22 75 37.5 
JSF 100 50 
F-16 100 50 
F-22 100 50 
S-3 50 25 S-3 75 37.5 S-3 100 50 
SSGN 30 15 SSGN 45 22.5 SSGN 60 30 
USV-1 5 2.5 USV-1 7.5 3.75 USV-1 10 5 
USV-2 5 2.5 USV-2 7.5 3.75 USV-2 10 5 
UAV-1 2 1 UAV-1 3 1.5 UAV-1 4 2 
UAV-2 20 10 UAV-2 30 15 UAV-2 40 20 
UAV-3 50 25 UAV-3 75 37.5 UAV-3 100 50 
UAV-4 70 35 UAV-4 105 52.5 UAV-4 140 70 
UAV-5 100 50 UAV-5 150 75 UAV-5 200 100 
MIW UUV 10 5 MIW UUV 15 7.5 MIW UUV 20 10 
ASW UUV 100 50 ASW UUV 150 75 ASW UUV 200 100 
• 
